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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
l~

THE :\IATTER OF THE

ESTA'1 E OF MARY E. RATLIFF,
Deceased.
EARL :\fr LAIN et al. and
FLRST SECl)RITY BANK
1

OF

rT~~H,

X.A.,
pf.a,intiffs and Respondents

I
I

Case No.
10604

vs.
MAYBJ£:LLE R. CONRAD,

Defendant and Appellant

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Respondents adopt the statement of Appellant set
out as the disposition in the lower Court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the motion to dismiss the
appeal of Appellant granted due to the fact that the requiremPnts of Rule 73 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure were not compiled with by the Appellant.
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In the alternative the Respondents seek to have the
order admitting the Will to Probate on January 4, 196(;
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents accept the Statement of Facts as being
true as set forth in their brief with the following additions:
Mary E. Ratliff, deceased, had her legal residence
in Vernal, Utah, for Fifty years and on May 3, 1965, at
Vernal, fell and broke her hip. She was flown to Dermr
for medical treatment where she passed away on Jmw
20, 1965.

Respondents filed their Petition for Probate of the
Will on November 19, 1965, in the Fourth Judicial District, Uintah County, State of Utah. The Appellant agreed
to pay the designated amounts to the legatees of tlw '
Will if the Will were probated in Colorado. This was
agreed to by the parties and the Petition for Probate was •
set for hearing on December 13, 1965. At that time the
children of Mrs. Conrad, Appellant, filed the Will Contest
and the Will was not admitted to probate in Colorado.

Respondents then noticed their Petition for Probate ,
on January 4, 1966. The 1Court, based upon the evidence
presented, admitted the certified copy of the Will to
Probate in Utah, with instruction to obtain the original
Will.
Shortly thereafter the Respondents filed a Petition
to Dislodge the Will in Colorado and the same was set
for hearing on March 16, 1966. At that hearing the Court
2

hpard evidence on the original Will from l\Ir. Harold
Sargent, one of the Witnesses to the Will, and from Mr.
Morris Cook, the Clerk of the Court of Uintah County,
StatP of Utah. Similar evidence was presented as was
produced in Utah. The Appellant could not and did not
:-how any evidence to indicate that Mary E. Ratliff was
a resident of Colorado or that she intended to change her
residPnce to Colorado.
·when this Appeal was filed the Court in Colorado
stayed the proceedings pending the ruling of this Court
on the Appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE
73\a) IN FILING THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL.
l\IOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL SHOULD HA VE
BEEN GRANTED.

Respondents Motion to Dismiss Appeal should have
been granted by this Honorable Court due to the fact
that the filing fee did not accompany the N oticc of Appeal
when filed ·with the County Clerk of Uintah County on
April 1, 1966. By the admission of counsel for appellant
the record discloses that the filing fee was not received
until Friday, April 8, 1966. It was then and only then
that the County Clerk could proceed to file the Notice
of Appeal.
In Jacobsen v. Jeffries, 86 U. 587, 47 P. 2d 892 (1935)
this Court held:
"Leaving a paper with a filing officer, a fee for
the filing of which is by the statute required to
3

be paid,_in advance, is not a filing. It is the duty of
the officer to collect and pay into the proper
~re::isury the fee provided by law before the paper
is filed. Should such officer inadvertently or otheiwise file a paper for which a fee is required to 1i~
paid, he is forthwith bound to account for such
fee whether or not he collected the fee at the tini~
the paper was left for filing."
"Under our law the filing of the record consists of
two acts, one of which is payment of the fee, and
the other of which is delivering the record to tht·
clerk. Neither act standing alone is a filing, or a
half filing, or of any avail as a filing.'' Gee r.
Smith, 52 Utah, 602, 176 P. 620, 621.
The Jacobsen case, supra, was cited in State 0. [\el- ,
son,
Wash.
, 107, P. 2d 1113, ( 1940). This case and
many cited therein conclude that a filing fee is a payment
in advance by statute and is a condition precedent to
the filing of Notice of Appeal. No filing is effective 1rithout the payment of a fee when required by statute.
In other cases it is held that a paper is filed when
it has been delivered to the proper officer and received
to be kept in the official records, does not apply where
the payment of a stated fee is made a prerequisite - in
these cases the paper is not filed until the fee has been
paid. Clearly that is the intent of the rule when it provides that the fee shall be paid when filing a document.
This Court in an opinion written by then Chief Jus- ,
tice Wade sets forth the rule under 73(1) U.R.C.P. which
in effect is the same as 73 (a) U.R.C.P. Bish 's Sheet Metal
Company, a Utah Corporation vs. Chris J. Luras d/b;a
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Liberty Bell Bakery Company, 11 Utah 2d 357, 359 P. 2d
21, (1%1) at page 358 :

''It is equally clear by the provisions of Rule
73(1), U.R.C.P. that the filing of the notice of the
a]Jpeal and the payment of the fees therefor \vithin the time allowed are the only requirements
necessary for the court to have jurisdiction. All
other steps, therefore, cannot affect the jurisdiction but any failure to follow the dictates of the
rules makes the appellant subject to appropriate
action by the court which may even include dismissal of the appeal."
As has been stated in the Bish's case, supra, the
filing of the notice of the appeal and the payment of the
fre within the time allowed are necessary jurisdiction
requirements without which this court has no jurisdiction.
Hence it follows that in this case the filing fee required by Rule 73(a) U.R.C.P. was not complied with by
the appellant and the court should have dismissed the
appeal. The appeal was not taken as required by the
statute.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE SH 0 WING JURISDICTIONAL
GROUNDS FOR PROBATE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE ORDER ADMITTING THE WILL
TO PROBATE.

Counsel for Appellant suggests that the evidence
received at the hearing held on January 4, 1966, is insuffieient to show jurisdictional grounds for admitting the
Will to probate.
Clearly the record shows that all parties were given
notice that the Petition to Admit the Will to Probate was
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to be heard on January 4, 1966. Appellant was represented on that day by and through her counsel, Mr. Buell
and Mr. Dillman. Appellants did not present one bit of '
evidence to show Mrs. Ratliff was not an actual and bona
fide resident of Uintah County, State of Utah. Having
failed to do so at that time and to refute the evidence of
respondents, after notice should not now be subject to
attack by the Appellants.
Subsequent to the January 4, 1966, hearing in the ,
Utah 1Court, the Respondents filed a Motion to dislodge
the Will held in Douglas County, Colorado on the basi:i
that Mrs. Ratliff was a resident of Utah and further that
the court of Utah had submitted the Will to probate and
thereby became the court of original jurisdiction.
A hearing was held on March 16, 1966, in Castle
Rock, County of Douglas, State of Colorado before Honorable Robert B. Lee, District Judge. The appellants sub- '
mitted no admissible evidence to show that the decedent
was a resident of Colorado.
The facts are that Mrs. Ratliff broke her hip in
Vernal and was flown to Denver for medical treatment ,
and died a month and a half later.
A residence once acquired remains until actually
abandoned with the intent to reuonce the same, and to
acquire a residence elsewhere, l\frs. Ratliff did not do
either.
The evidence and record clearly shows the legal resi- ,
dence of Mrs. Ratliff to be in Utah. Appellant introduced
no evidence to the contrary at the time the Will ·was admitted to Probate in Utah or at the Colorado hearing.
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From the evidence introduced on January 4, 1966, it
is clear that the decendent was a resident of Vernal,
Fintah ·County, State of Utah. She had voted in Vernal
for many years, the latest being in the 1964 election. She
had her home in Vernal, bank accounts, the witnesses to
the Will of October 6, 1961 and the Codicil dated May 1,
196:2, wPre Vernal residents and memorial services were
held for the decedent in Vernal. None of these facts were
contradicted to by appellant at any time.
Tlw lower court did not err in admitting the "Will"
to probate and its order should be affirmed.
POINT III
A WILL MAY BE ADMITTED TO PROBATE UPON

THE PRODUCTION AND PROOF OF A CERTIFIED
COPY OF A WILL WHERE THE WILL IS UNAVAILABLE.

Counsel for Appellant state a certified copy of the
original Will was improperly admitted to probate in Utah.
\YhPre it was clearly explained to the court that the
decedent was a resident of Utah and the fact that original
jurisdiction should be in Utah the court did not err in
admitting the "Will" to probate. The "~Will'' was not lost
or destroyed but was actually in existence and lodged
under the Colorado Statute in Douglas County. The Will
has not been, and is not now, admitted to probate in Colorado. The Colorado Court has not refused to transmit
the Will to the Utah Court. The matter is still pending.
At the Colorado hearing and prior to the attempted
filing of this appeal the Colorado Court informed the
appellant that unless she supplied it with cases sustain7

ing her position, or, could show the Utah Court's Order
Admitting Will to Probate was void, an order transmit.
ting \Vill to the Utah Court would be issued.
Respondents filed a Petition for Probate of ~Will in
Utah, Fourth Judicial District, on November 19, 1965,
and the same was set for hearing on November 30, 1965.
At the request of Counsel for Appellant, the hearing wa~
continued. It was again noticed and heard on January±,
1966, \\<'hen the Utah Court by appropriate order admitted '
the "Will'' to Probate .
.Counsel for Appellant states (Brief P. 5) that tl1e
Respondents could have challeneged the jurisdiction of
the Court in Douglas County to admit the "Will" to probate on December 13, 1965. Respondents had no reason
to as it was agreed that Colorado could handle the probate if the terms of the "Will" were carried out, hut
Appellant's son and daughter filed the Caveat 'rhich
contested the Will.
In order to obtain the "\Vill" Respondent's counse1
filed a Petition to dislodge the Will from the Colorado
Court, immediately after the certified photo copy was
admitted in Utah and argued the same on l\f arch 16, 19t16.
Judge Robert B. Lee made an order staying proceeding1
until the Utah Supreme Court rules on whether or not
the Utah Courts order was void. Respondents will proceed to obtain the "\Vill" from Colorado if this court
affirms the lower courts decision.
It is true that the Utah Statute does not specifically
provide that a certified photo-copy of a Will may be
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admitted, however, the general equity power of a Probate
Court, should recognize how much better evidence a certified photo-copy of the original Will is than an unsigned
office co11y. CL>rtainly this is far superior evidence and
,rithin the inknt of the legislature which was to permit
the introduction of the best evidence of the Will available.
Tht> "Will" was properly identified by Mr. Harold
Sarg·ent ( t. p. J, 5, G,7) and he was one of the attesting
11 itnesses t11ereto and it was duly identified in every respect to ht' admitted to probate. The other attesting witne"s having died. ( T. p. 5). The evidence then showed
that the decendent was a resident of Vernal, Uintah Count:-, State of Ftah, at the time of her deat hand that appellant introuuced no evidence to the contrary.

CONCLUSION
These facts when taken in light of the hearing held
in Castle Rock, ·Colorado, on March 16, 1966, clearly indi.
cate that the decendent was not a resident of Colorado or
domiciled therein and the Court di dnot err in admitting
the "Will" to probate.
The court was correct m admitting the "Will'' to
probate in Utah where the original "Will" was detained,
but not admitted to probate, in a foreign court, so that
respondents could not produce the same. The grounds
for admitting the "Will'' to probate are set forth in
75-3-3 U.C.A. (1953). The jurisdictional facts are set
forth in the Petition of Respondents and the same were
proved on January 4, 1966.
The lower courts admitting the ·will to probate under
these circumstances should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

COLTON & HAMMOND
Hugh ·w. Colton
55 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah
and
BEASLIN, NYGAARD,
COKE & VINCENT
John C. Beaslin
447 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Attorneys f.or
Plaintiff-Respondents
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